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“MEMBERS ONLY”:  A CRITIQUE OF  
MONTANA V. UNITED STATES 
WILLIAM P. ZUGER* 
The renowned turn-of-the-twentieth-century cynic, Ambrose Bierce, 
defined “lawful” as “[c]ompatible with the will of a  
judge having jurisdiction.”1  For those of us who aspire to a  
higher standard, we have the Law Review. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The landmark United States Supreme Court case defining civil 
jurisdiction of Indian courts is Montana v. United States.2  Four years after 
its decision, the Supreme Court, in the case of Strate v. A-1 Contractors,3 
characterized Montana as “the pathmarking case concerning tribal civil 
 
*William P. Zuger is the Chief Judge for the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court, at Fort 
Yates, North Dakota.  He is a 1972 graduate of the University of Minnesota School of Law, and 
has been licensed in North Dakota since 1972.  He retired from the full-time practice of law, 
primarily in the area of health care law, in 1996. 
1. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL’S DICTIONARY 75 (Dover Publications, Inc., 1958). 
2. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
3. 520 U.S. 438 (1997). 
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authority over nonmembers.”4  As we will see, the confusing and con-
voluted opinion in Montana was anything but “pathmarking,” and remained 
unresolved in its scope for nearly a decade.  Montana remains confusing to 
the present day, even to attorneys and judges familiar with Indian law. 
The case was brought by the United States for two reasons.  First, both 
in its own right and as trustee for the Crow Tribe of eastern Montana, the 
United States wanted to quiet title to the bed of the Big Horn River.5  The 
Court held title to the river bed had passed from the tribe to the United 
States, at least in part by the legislative allotment of tribal land (presumably 
before and after Montana statehood) intended to terminate the reservation, 
so that the “navigable” stream bed was transferred in fee title to Montana 
upon statehood.6 
Second, the United States wanted to determine the validity of Crow 
legislation asserting jurisdiction to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing 
rights on nonmember fee land within the external boundaries of the 
Reservation.7  However, the issue of continuing civil jurisdiction over 
activities by non-Indians or non-tribal members, the subject of its 
“pathmarking” status and the rationale for the distinction between the two 
classes, was not made clear.  In Montana, the Court stated the permissible 
extent of Indian civil jurisdiction as follows: 
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, 
the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships 
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, 
contracts, leases, or other arrangements.  A tribe may also retain 
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-
Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct 
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the 
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.8 
This extent is collectively referred to in Indian law as Montana exceptions 
one and two because they are exceptions to “the general proposition that the 
inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities 
of nonmembers of the tribe.”9 
This article will first discuss the precedent leading up to the decision in 
Montana and the reasoning by which the Court reached its conclusion.  
Next, this article will explain subsequent treatment of the case by the Court.  
 
4. Strate, 520 U.S. at 445. 
5. Montana, 450 U.S. at 547. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 565-66 (internal citations omitted). 
9. Id. at 565. 
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Lastly, this article will discuss the practical ramifications of the case upon 
Indian country. 
II. OLIPHANT V. SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE 
Montana was decided in the context of several other contemporary 
cases addressing the permissible limits of Indian jurisdiction.  Of these, the 
criminal jurisdiction case of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe10 was 
specifically cited as controlling authority for the holding in Montana.11  The 
majority opinion of the Court in Montana was clearly prefaced upon the 
Oliphant decision, as the majority opinion stated: “Though Oliphant only 
determined inherent tribal authority in criminal matters, the principles on 
which it relied support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign 
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of 
the tribe.”12  However, Oliphant did not make a distinction between 
members and nonmembers, but rested solely upon the Indian status of the 
defendant, without regard to whether he or she was a member of the tribe 
asserting jurisdiction.13 
The Oliphant Court further relied on the authority of Ex parte Crow 
Dog.14  In Ex parte Crow Dog, the Court was faced with almost the inverse 
issue presented in Montana: whether, prior to the passage of the Major 
Crimes Act, federal courts had jurisdiction to try Indians who had offended 
against fellow Indians on reservation land.15  The Oliphant Court 
recognized an increased sophistication of several tribal courts that now 
resemble state counterparts, as well as the disappearance of many of the 
dangers of exercised jurisdiction over non-Indians due to the passage of the 
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.16  The Court also acknowledged the tribe-
argued need to try non-Indians due to a recognized incidence of non-Indian 
crime on reservations.17 The Court noted, however, such considerations of 
 
10. 435 U.S. 191 (1978) 
11. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. 
12. Id.  
13. Id.  The Court, in a footnote, spoke of Indian status, not membership status: 
By denying the Suquamish Tribe criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, however, the 
Oliphant case would seriously restrict the ability of a tribe to enforce any purported 
regulation of non-Indian hunters and fishermen.  Moreover, a tribe would not be able 
to rely for enforcement on the federal criminal trespass statute, since that statute does 
not apply to fee patented lands. 
Id. at 565 n.14 (internal citations omitted). 
14. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
15. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557. 
16. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211-12 (1978). 
17. Id. 
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whether Indian tribes should be authorized to try non-Indians are ones 
properly made by Congress.18 
Nowhere in Oliphant did the Supreme Court ever address jurisdiction 
over members, as opposed to Indians.19  Ultimately, as this article will 
address, Montana also stands for the odd proposition that the power to in-
voke civil remedies is less extensive than the power to put one in jail.20 
III. MONTANA V. UNITED STATES 
A careful reading of Montana leaves the reader puzzled at the 
appearance of “member” as the basis for exception one and “Indian” as the 
basis for exception two.21  The Court did not say why it drew these two 
very different distinctions, and it appears the Court used the two terms 
interchangeably throughout its opinion.  The obvious dichotomy was not 
addressed by the lengthy dissent of Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall, or the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens.  The 
civil jurisdiction holding of the case was not addressed by Justice Stevens 
in his concurrence, and Justice Blackmun addressed it without reflection as 
a footnote.22 
The analysis in Montana leading to the holding is replete with refer-
ences to Indians, rather than members.  In reviewing legislative history, the 
Montana Court spoke specifically of the limitation of civil jurisdiction to 
Indians, not members, noting there is no such suggestion Congress intended 
non-Indians settling or purchasing allotted lands would be subject to tribal 
authority.23  Other specific legislative history cited in the opinion also dis-
cussed jurisdiction in terms of Indian status and not membership status: 
“Non-Indians are not subject to the jurisdiction of Indian courts and cannot 
 
18. Id. 
19. The Supreme Court in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), further limited tribal criminal 
jurisdiction to members of the tribe only, but it was decided nearly ten years subsequent to 
Montana.  Duro was promptly abrogated by Congress with the “Duro fix.”  See Pub. L. No. 101-
511, Title VIII, § 8077(b)-(c), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (1990) (codified in 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) 
(2006)). 
20. See discussion infra Section V. 
21. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). 
22. Id. at 581 n.18.  Justice Blackmun stated: 
I agree with the Court’s resolution of the question of the power of the Tribe to regulate 
non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of 
the Tribe.  I note only that nothing in the Court's disposition of that issue is 
inconsistent with the conclusion that the bed of the Big Horn River belongs to the 
Crow Indians. 
Id. 
23. Id. at 559-60 n.9 (internal citations omitted). 
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be tried in Indian courts on trespass charges.  Further, there are no Federal 
laws which can be invoked against trespassers.”24 
A. CASE PRECEDENT 
The first reference to members appeared, again without apparent reflec-
tion, as the Court discussed the principles of inherent sovereignty described 
in United States v. Wheeler.25  The Montana Court stated: 
In [Wheeler], noting that Indian tribes are “unique aggregations 
possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and 
their territory,” the Court upheld the power of a tribe to punish 
tribal members who violate tribal criminal laws.  But the Court 
was careful to note that, through their original incorporation into 
the United States as well as through specific treaties and statutes, 
the Indian tribes have lost many of the attributes of sovereignty.26 
The Court distinguished between those inherent powers retained by the 
tribes and those divested, stating “[t]he areas in which such implicit dives-
titure of sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those involving the 
relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe . . . .”27 
However, Wheeler was a case involving the criminal prosecution of a 
member.28  Wheeler also did not involve jurisdiction over nonmember 
Indians and did not discuss jurisdiction over non-Indians, repeatedly citing 
Oliphant as authority.29  Thus, it could not be precedent for Montana and 
the limitation of jurisdiction to members.  Indeed, Wheeler suffered from 
some of the same limitations as did Montana, as illustrated by the Wheeler 
Court concluding, “as we have recently held, they cannot try nonmembers 
in tribal courts.”30  However, the problem remained of the proper distinction 
between nonmember and non-Indian. 
B. TREATIES 
Furthermore, the treatment of the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty31 in the 
majority opinion of Montana, while not specifically discussing it in regard 
to the sovereignty issue, supports the conclusion that, by treaty, the United 
 
24. Id. at 562 n.11 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 85-2593, at 2 (1958)). 
25. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
26. Montana, 450 U.S. at 563 (citations omitted) (citing Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 232, 236). 
27. Id. at 564 (emphasis added). 
28. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. 
29. Id. at 323, 325-26.  In fact, Wheeler was decided later the same month as Oliphant in 
March of 1978. 
30. Id. at 326 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978)). 
31. Standing Rock is also a party to the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty. 
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States actually recognized the inherent tribal jurisdiction of the Fort 
Laramie Treaty tribes over nonmember Indians.32 Thus, while the Court 
held the treaty did not preserve jurisdiction over the Big Horn River bed, 
the very language selected for citation by the Court clearly recognized the 
right of the tribes to submit to their jurisdiction “the Indians herein named, 
and for such other friendly tribes or individual Indians as from time to time 
they may be willing, with the consent of the United States, to admit 
amongst them” and the tribal right of “absolute and undisturbed use and 
occupation” of their lands.33  Reservations are commonly home not just to 
members of the particular tribe, but to Indians of other tribes, as well.  As a 
result, the majority in Montana found the treaty to be pertinent to juris-
diction, for Justice Stewart cited it as precedent.34 
C. LEGISLATIVE ACTS 
Also noteworthy is the Montana Court’s analysis of the impact of the 
assimilative acts of the General Allotment Act and the Crow Allotment Act 
and their impact on non-Indian allottees of fee land.35  The Court found the 
purpose of the Acts was, at least in part, to terminate the Indian Nations in 
order to state a congressional policy to remove nonmembers, or at least 
non-Indians, and their land from tribal jurisdiction.36 
 
32. Montana, 450 U.S. at 558-59. 
The 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, 15 Stat. 649, reduced the size of the Crow territory 
designated by the 1851 treaty.  Article II of the treaty established a reservation for the 
Crow Tribe, and provided that it be “set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use 
and occupation of the Indians herein named, and for such other friendly tribes or 
individual Indians as from time to time they may be willing, with the consent of the 
United States, to admit amongst them . . . ,” (emphasis added) and that “the United 
States now solemnly agrees that no persons, except those herein designated and 
authorized so to do . . . shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in 
the territory described in this article for the use of said Indians . . . .”  The treaty, 
therefore, obligated the United States to prohibit most non-Indians from residing on or 
passing through reservation lands used and occupied by the Tribe, and, thereby, 
arguably conferred upon the Tribe the authority to control fishing and hunting on those 
lands.  But that authority could only extend to land on which the Tribe exercises 
“absolute and undisturbed use and occupation.” . . .  If the 1868 treaty created tribal 
power to restrict or prohibit non-Indian hunting and fishing on the reservation, that 
power cannot apply to lands held in fee by non-Indians. 
Id. 
33. Id. at 559.  Justice Blackmun also directly addressed and quoted this specific passage in 
his dissent.  Id. at 575 n.10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
34. See id. at 557-59 (majority opinion) (addressing the treaty as to the river bed ownership 
issue). 
35. See generally id. at 559 (discussing the impact of the General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 
388, and the Crow Allotment Act, 41 Stat. 751). 
36. Id.  Specifically, the Court stated: 
[I]t is clear that the quantity of such land was substantially reduced by the allotment 
and alienation of tribal lands as a result of the passage of the General Allotment Act of 
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In a footnote, the Court noted the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s dis-
cussion of the Allotment Acts recognizing neither of the Acts explicitly 
restricts a tribe’s rights over hunting and fishing, and no evidence shows 
Congress intended that nonmembers residing on such lands must first seek 
tribal consent before hunting and fishing.37  However, nothing in the 
Allotment Acts supported the view of the Court of Appeals that the Tribe 
could nevertheless bar hunting and fishing by non-resident fee owners 
because the policy of the Acts was the “eventual assimilation of the Indian 
population and the gradual extinction of Indian reservations and Indian 
titles.”38  The Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs repeatedly emphasized the allotment policy was designed to 
eventually eliminate tribal relations.39 
There was no discussion in Montana as to why a legislative history 
consistent with limiting civil jurisdiction over non-Indians is consistent with 
limiting jurisdiction to members only.  Given the subsequent abandonment 
of the termination and assimilation policies of the General Allotment Act, it 
is also questionable that the policy remains a convincing precedent 120 
years later.  Obviously recognizing the problem, Justice Stewart then 
addressed it, noting although the allotment and sale of surplus reservation 
lands had been rejected, it was relevant to the effect of Indian use and occu-
pation of the reservation lands affected by the policy.40 
The Court is partly right, but partly not right.  Even if the history is 
relevant to the issue of whether river bed title transferred to Montana on 
admission to the Union in 1889, the history would still not be pertinent to a 
jurisdiction issue arising in 1981, after federal policy had clearly changed.  
 
1887, and the Crow Allotment Act of 1920.  If the 1868 treaty created tribal power to 
restrict or prohibit non-Indian hunting and fishing on the reservation, that power 
cannot apply to lands held in fee by non-Indians. 
Id. 
37. Id. at 558. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 559-60 n.9. 
40. Id. at 560 n.9 (internal citations omitted). 
In Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., . . . the relevant treaty included 
language virtually identical to that in the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie.  The Puyallup 
Reservation was to be “set apart, and, so far as necessary, surveyed and marked out for 
their exclusive use . . . [and no] white man [was to] be permitted to reside upon the 
same without permission of the tribe . . . .”  The Puyallup Tribe argued that those 
words amounted to a grant of authority to fish free of state interference.  But this Court 
rejected that argument, finding, in part, that it “clashe[d] with the subsequent history 
of the reservation . . . ,” notably two Acts of Congress under which the Puyallups 
alienated, in fee simple, the great majority of the lands in the reservation, including all 
the land abutting the Puyallup River. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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However, Justice Stewart did not address the issue of its pertinence in terms 
of post-1934 jurisdiction. 
As to the relevance of history, perhaps telling of the Court’s mindset is 
Justice Stewart’s rejection of the United States’ argument, based on a treaty 
with the Puyallup Tribe, that treaty rights must be construed “with the sub-
sequent history of the reservation.”41  This is, in simple terms, a “heads I 
win, tails you lose” logic, in which treaty rights are enforced in light of 
1887 federal policy when it favors the tribe, and modern policy when it 
favors the state or the non-Indian. 
Justice Blackmun, who authored the Montana dissenting opinion,42 
noted the change in federal policy regarding post-1934 jurisdiction in the 
1989 case of Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima 
Indian Nation,43 when he inquired, 
[H]ow should we read Montana, where the Court held that the 
Tribe had no inherent authority to prohibit non-Indians from 
hunting and fishing on fee lands within the reservation?  With 
respect to Montana’s “general principle” creating a presumption 
against tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians absent express 
congressional delegation, I find it evident that the Court simply 
missed its usual way.44 
From his statement, it is apparent that even eight years after the Court’s 
rendition of the Montana exceptions, Justice Blackmun, who was on the 
Montana Court, was still talking in terms of Indian status, not membership, 
apparently based on his continuing understanding of the case.45  The rest of 
us, who were not in on the deliberation and decision of the case, can be 
excused if we are also at a loss to understand the distinction drawn (or not 
drawn) between Indians and tribal members. 
D. NORTH DAKOTA INTERPRETATION 
Frustration in understanding the difference between non-Indian and 
nonmember was also expressed in general terms by Chief Justice of the 
North Dakota Supreme Court, Gerald VandeWalle, in his special con-
currence in the 2004 case of Winer v. Penny Enterprises, Inc.46 In Winer, 
the Chief Justice noted when it comes to matters involving Indian 
 
41. Id. at 560. 
42. See id. at 569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
43. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). 
44. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 455. 
45. See id. at 448 (emphasis added). 
46. 2004 ND 21, 674 N.W.2d 9. 
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reservation jurisdiction, he is “unwilling to abandon [the Court’s] precedent 
unless the United States Supreme Court in a factually similar case, tells us 
our precedent is wrong.”47 
In the North Dakota Supreme Court’s most recent Indian civil juris-
diction case reported, Justice Kapsner cast the issue still in terms of Indian 
status rather than membership status, citing Williams v. Lee48 and Winer as 
controlling precedent.49  In the case involving a nonmember seeking declar-
atory judgment regarding his interest under a lease, the justice noted, 
“[u]nder the infringement test, tribal courts have exclusive civil jurisdiction 
over claims in which a non-Indian asserts a claim against an Indian for con-
duct occurring on that Indian’s reservation.”50  The court went on to 
explain, “North Dakota has disclaimed jurisdiction over Indian reservation 
lands . . . and has consistently held that state courts have no jurisdiction 
over civil causes of action involving Indians, arising within the exterior 
boundaries of an Indian Reservation, unless a majority of the enrolled 
residents of the Reservation vote to accept jurisdiction.”51 
It is clear from North Dakota cases that is has been difficult to meander 
through the work product of the United States Supreme Court in terms of 
their use of non-Indian and nonmember.  The United States Supreme Court 
revisited Indian civil jurisdiction twice more over the next ten years, but it 
failed to address the confusion it has generated concerning the distinction 
between members and Indians.52  It was not until 1990, in Duro v. Reina,53 
that the Court finally directly addressed the issue. 
 
47. Winer, ¶ 26, 674 N.W.2d at 18 (VandeWalle, J., concurring). 
48. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
In Williams, a non-Indian creditor operating a general store on reservation land 
brought an action against an Indian in state court.  The United States Supreme Court 
said, [t]here can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would 
undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would 
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.  Though the claimant was 
non-Indian, [h]e was on the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took place 
there. 
Gustafson v. Poitra, 2011 ND 150, ¶ 10, 800 N.W.2d 842, 847 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
49. Gustafson, ¶¶ 10, 13, 800 N.W.2d at 846-48. 
50. Id., ¶ 10, 800 N.W.2d at, 847 (citations omitted). 
51. Id. ¶ 13, 800 N.W.2d at 848 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
52. See generally Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nations, 
492 U.S. 408 (1989); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
53. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
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IV. DURO V. REINA 
In Duro, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether tribal 
criminal jurisdiction extended to nonmember Indians54 in order to resolve a 
conflict between the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.55  As the lower court that 
earlier decided Duro, the Ninth Circuit concluded the tribes did indeed have 
inherent jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.  In a separate tribal juris-
diction case, the Eighth Circuit had concluded they did not.56 
Within the Duro decision, the Supreme Court finally recognized the 
fact that Montana had not clearly marked the path in Indian civil juris-
diction, as noted in its rendition of the proceedings in the Ninth Circuit.57  
Justice Kennedy, writing the majority opinion in Duro, recognized the con-
fusion that had resulted from the Court’s earlier cases, as he framed the 
issues.58 
Although a criminal case, Duro clearly impacts an analysis of civil 
jurisdiction, as the Court approached jurisdiction in terms of sovereignty.59 
 
54. Duro, 495 U.S. at 679. 
55. Id. at 684. 
56. See id.; see also Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486, 488 (8th Cir. 1988). 
57. Duro, 495 U.S. at 682-83. 
The Court of Appeals examined our opinion in United States v. Wheeler . . . [and] 
concluded that the distinction drawn between members and nonmembers of a tribe 
throughout our Wheeler opinion was “indiscriminate,” and that the court should give 
“little weight to these casual references.”  The court also found the historical record 
“equivocal” on the question of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers.  The Court of 
Appeals then examined the federal criminal statutes applicable to Indian country.  
Finding that references to “Indians” in those statutes and the cases construing them 
applied to all Indians, without respect to their particular tribal membership, the court 
concluded that “if Congress had intended to divest tribal courts of criminal jurisdiction 
over nonmember Indians they would have done so.”  The tribes, it held, retain 
jurisdiction over minor crimes committed by Indians against other Indians “without 
regard to tribal membership.” 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 685-86.  The Court noted: 
A basic attribute of full territorial sovereignty is the power to enforce laws against all 
who come within the sovereign’s territory, whether citizens or aliens.  Oliphant recog-
nized that the tribes can no longer be described as sovereigns in this sense.  Rather, as 
our discussion in Wheeler reveals, the retained sovereignty of the tribes is that needed 
to control their own internal relations, and to preserve their own unique customs and 
social order.  The power of a tribe to prescribe and enforce rules of conduct for its own 
members “does not fall within that part of sovereignty which the Indians implicitly 
lost by virtue of their dependent status.  The areas in which such implicit divestiture of 
sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those involving the relations between 
an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe.”  As we further described the distinction:  
“[T]he dependent status of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily 
inconsistent with their freedom independently to determine their external relations.  
But the powers of self-government, including the power to prescribe and enforce 
internal criminal laws, are of a different type. They involve only the relations among 
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Thus, the Court appears to have considered and analyzed the issue of 
criminal jurisdiction as subsumed within the remaining inherent sovereignty 
of the tribe.60  The Court opened this analysis by addressing the limitations 
in its own precedent in Oliphant, which established the inherent sovereignty 
of tribes does not extend to criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who 
commit crimes on the reservation, and Wheeler, which affirmed recognition 
of tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by tribe members, conceding it 
had not determined the member/Indian dichotomy.61  Noting the juncture of 
the two precedents—an Indian, but not a member of the tribe as the subject 
of jurisdiction—the Court addressed the question of whether tribal 
sovereignty of a tribe includes criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers.62 
With the admission that the Court’s own precedent was not as 
controlling as previously stated, the Court then turned to a lengthy dis-
cussion of federal policy as addressed in prior court cases, congressional 
enactments, legislative history, and executive policies.  The Court also 
reviewed federal policy primarily in the civil context.63 
 
members of a tribe . . . .  [T]hey are not such powers as would necessarily be lost by 
virtue of a tribe's dependent status. 
Id. (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 684-85. 
62. Id. 
We think the rationale of our decisions in Oliphant and Wheeler . . . compels the 
conclusion that Indian tribes lack jurisdiction over persons who are not tribe members.  
Our discussion of tribal sovereignty in Wheeler bears most directly on this case.  We 
were consistent in describing retained tribal sovereignty over the defendant in terms of 
a tribe’s power over its members.  Indeed, our opinion in Wheeler stated that the tribes 
“cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts.”  Literal application of that statement to these 
facts would bring this case to an end.  Yet respondents and amici, including the United 
States, argue forcefully that this statement in Wheeler cannot be taken as a statement 
of the law, for the party before the Court in Wheeler was a member of the Tribe.  It is 
true that Wheeler presented no occasion for a holding on the present facts. 
Id.  (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326). 
63. Id. at 689-91.  In addressing federal legislative history, the Court observed: 
Congressional and administrative provisions such as those cited above reflect the 
Government’s treatment of Indians as a single large class with respect to federal 
jurisdiction and programs. Those references are not dispositive of a question of tribal 
power to treat Indians by the same broad classification. 
. . . . 
We did note in Wheeler that federal statutes showed Congress had recognized and 
declined to disturb the traditional and “undisputed” power of the tribes over members.  
But for the novel and disputed issue in the case before us, the statutes reflect at most 
the tendency of past Indian policy to treat Indians as an undifferentiated class. The 
historical record prior to the creation of modern tribal courts shows little federal 
attention to the individual tribes’ powers as between themselves or over one another’s 
members. 
. . . . 
Evidence on criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers is less clear, but on balance 
supports the view that inherent tribal jurisdiction extends to tribe members only. 
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The Court recognized the obvious principle of law that criminal san-
ctions imply that, to the extent criminal jurisdiction is different from civil 
jurisdiction, it is more, not less, limited.64  The option of the Court to 
selectively pick and choose from history to support its conclusion is brought 
full circle, basing its conclusion on a number of previous opinions.65 
For better or for worse, the opinion was based, ultimately, on the 
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal policy, but not that 
of the Congress or the administration.  It is the United States Congress, not 
the Supreme Court, that exercises plenary power over Indian Country, as 
recognized by the Supreme Court in Wheeler:  “The sovereignty that the 
Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character.  It exists only at the 
sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.  But until 
Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers.”66 
In direct response to Duro, however, Congress did act, and did so 
swiftly, with what has become popularly denominated as the “Duro fix.”  
Duro was decided on May 29, 1990, and on November 5, 1990, the Indian 
Civil Rights Act was amended to read, in pertinent part, as follows: 
“powers of self-government” means and includes all governmental 
powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
64. Id. at 687-88. 
It is true that our decisions recognize broader retained tribal powers outside the 
criminal context.  Tribal courts, for example, resolve civil disputes involving 
nonmembers, including non-Indians.  Civil authority may also be present in areas such 
as zoning where the exercise of tribal authority is vital to the maintenance of tribal 
integrity and self-determination.  As distinct from criminal prosecution, this civil 
authority typically involves situations arising from property ownership within the 
reservation or “consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through com-
mercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.”  The exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction subjects a person not only to the adjudicatory power of the tribunal, but 
also to the prosecuting power of the tribe, and involves a far more direct intrusion on 
personal liberties. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
65. Id.  The Court justified its conclusion noting: 
The Solicitor suggested two alternative remedies, amendment of the tribal constitution 
and delegation of federal authority from the Secretary.  One of these options would 
reflect a belief that tribes possess inherent sovereignty over nonmembers, while the 
other would indicate its absence.  Two later opinions, however, give a strong 
indication that the new tribal courts were not understood to possess power over non-
members.  One mentions only adoption of nonmembers into the tribe or receipt of 
delegated authority as means of acquiring jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.  A 
final opinion states more forcefully that the only means by which a tribe could deal 
with interloping nonmember Indians were removal of the offenders from the reser-
vation or acceptance of delegated authority.  These opinions provide the most specific 
historical evidence on the question before us and, we think, support our conclusion. 
Id. at 691-92 (internal citations omitted). 
66. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). 
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judicial, and all offices, bodies, and tribunals by and through 
which they are executed, including courts of Indian offenses; and 
means inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and 
affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians . . . .67 
The Supreme Court in Strate, summing up Montana, had said “absent a 
different congressional direction, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the 
conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation . . . .”68 
Congress did not just legislate, it took the unusual step of including, in the 
actual statute, its policy statement that jurisdiction over all Indians was an 
incident of inherent sovereignty and inherent jurisdiction,69 a congressional 
finding inconsistent with the Court’s opinion in Montana.  As a result, 
Congress’ apparent intent was to clarify that it was not resurrecting an 
abrogated sovereignty, but it was rather recognizing inherent jurisdiction, 
which had never been subject to any congressional limitation in the first 
place, as a continuing principle.  It would appear, indeed, that in grounding 
the legislative “Duro Fix” in continuing and inherent sovereign jurisdiction, 
Congress gave the Court all the direction it needed to arrive at a truly 
“pathmarking” definition of the inherent sovereignty, as it pertained to civil 
jurisdiction.  Yet, to this day, the Court has not accepted the challenge and 
Montana, with all its logical defects and circumlocution, remains the con-
trolling law in Indian country. 
Thus, with the “Duro Fix,” the policy underpinnings of both Duro and 
Montana were repudiated.  Unfortunately, though, their holdings remain 
unchanged as is evidenced in the Court’s most recent iteration, Plains 
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.,70 in regards to the 
issue of membership as the factor defining the limits of civil jurisdiction. 
V. THE VIEW FROM INDIAN COUNTRY 
As stated by Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Senior Judge William C. 
Canby, Jr., “[a]t the same time that Congress and the Executive have been 
acting to strengthen the tribes, the Supreme Court has been narrowing tribal 
power over nonmembers within tribal reservations.”71  The Supreme Court 
does not lack talent, either in its justices or their clerks.  How, then, do we 
account for nearly a decade of obfuscation and a continuing lack of clarity? 
 
67. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006) (emphasis added). 
68. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 446 (1997). 
69. See Pub. L. No. 101-511, Title VIII, § 8077(b)-(c), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (1990) 
(codified in 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)) (emphasis added). 
70. 554 U.S. 316 (2008). 
71. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 33-34 (West, 5th ed. 
2009). 
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As we have seen, Montana is not confidently grounded in either legit-
imate precedent or in federal congressional or executive policy.  Rather, it 
appears the reticence of the Supreme Court to follow clearly expressed con-
gressional policy is grounded in another factor, the expression of which 
might not strike any court as politically correct, but which appears to be 
tacitly addressed, nonetheless, in the following passage from Duro: 
Our cases suggest constitutional limitations even on the ability of 
Congress to subject American citizens to criminal proceedings 
before a tribunal that does not provide constitutional protections as 
a matter of right.  We have approved delegation to an Indian tribe 
of the authority to promulgate rules that may be enforced by 
criminal sanction in federal court, but no delegation of authority to 
a tribe has to date included the power to punish non-members in 
tribal court.  We decline to produce such a result through 
recognition of inherent tribal authority.72 
Retained criminal jurisdiction over members, who are also citizens, is 
accepted by court precedent and justified by the voluntary character of 
tribal membership and the concomitant right of participation in a tribal gov-
ernment, the authority of which rests on consent.73 
The tacit message is that Indian courts are not required to provide due 
process, but many do and they should not be lumped together with those 
that do not.  It is still not uncommon for the states to vest both civil and 
criminal jurisdiction in non-law trained magistrates, just as many tribes 
must, for lack of resources.  Despite the limitation on resources, the 
Supreme Court does not strip these magistrates of jurisdiction.  Rather, it 
sets due process standards to which the state courts must adhere.  Indian 
country is entitled to the same treatment.  Perhaps Montana and its progeny 
can best be attributed to the adage that hard cases make bad law. 
Furthermore, it is a fiction that tribal membership is a matter of 
consent, just as it would be a fiction to suggest that one’s citizenship in 
North Dakota or the United States stems from consent.  The bulk of any 
tribe’s membership is confined to those born on the reservation and, thus, 
born into membership.  By continuing to be members, Indians have never 
contemplated a choice of jurisdiction, criminal or civil.  Indeed, there are 
many nonmembers and non-Indians who have chosen to move into the 
jurisdiction, which may support, jurisprudentially, the Supreme Court in 
extending civil jurisdiction to all who have chosen to live on the 
 
72. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693-94 (1990) (emphasis added) (internal citations 
omitted); cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). 
73. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693-94. 
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reservation.  To rest something as fundamental as sovereign jurisdiction on 
such a premise, though, does nothing to advance the day-to-day lives and 
interests of members, nonmembers, or non-Indians on the reservation.  In 
the wake of Montana, nonmembers, Indian and non-Indian alike, fall 
through the cracks which permeate the interstices of state, federal, and tribal 
jurisdiction. 
Certainly, it would be foreseeable to the Supreme Court that if the 
same test were applied to the states, it would create a jurisdictional void, 
and this void is exactly what has occurred on the reservation.  A prime 
example is in the area of domestic violence, where lack of criminal and 
civil jurisdiction has been determined to be a contributing factor in the 
epidemic of sexual and domestic violence in Indian country.74  Today, tribal 
courts cannot act on a domestic violence petition brought by a nonmember 
Indian against another nonmember Indian because there is a lack of civil 
jurisdiction.75  Nor can the tribe proceed criminally against a non-Indian 
spouse or partner of an Indian living on the reservation.76 
On July 21, 2011, the United States Department of Justice sent a 
proposed draft of legislation to Congress in order to extend both criminal 
and civil jurisdiction to non-Indian domestic partners as a proposed amend-
ment to the Violence Against Women Act.77  In identical letters to Senate 
President Biden and House Speaker Boehner, Assistant Attorney General 
Ronald Weich summarized and addressed the jurisdictional dilemma.78  
Weich described in detail the alarming rate of violence and assault against 
Native American women that goes unaddressed due to the ill-suited legal 
structure for prosecuting domestic violence in Indian country and lack of 
access to federal resources.79 
At Standing Rock, we face problems with dismissals of civil actions 
due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  For instance, we cannot address 
a domestic violence restraining order petition brought by one Cheyenne 
River member against another, even though the reservation is contiguous to 
Standing Rock.  Deprived of Standing Rock civil jurisdiction, the petitioner 
 
74. Letter from Ronald Weich, U.S. Assistant Attorney Gen., to The Honorable Joseph R. 
Biden, Vice President, and The Honorable John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House (July 21, 2011) 
(on file with author). 
75. See discussion supra Section III. 
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006) (”Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general 
laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses within the sole and exclusive juris-
diction of the United States . . . shall extend to Indian country); Williams v. United States, 327 
U.S. 711, 713-14 (1946). 
77. Letter from Weich, supra note 74. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
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is without a forum because his own tribe has no extra-territorial jurisdiction 
and the state may lack jurisdiction over a case on the reservation between 
two Indians, as well.80  In simple terms, the United States Supreme Court, 
through short-sighted analysis, has carved out substantial voids in civil 
matters, which fall into jurisdictional limbo. 
The proposed legislation would address the voids in civil, as well as 
criminal, jurisdiction in the limited area of domestic violence.  Because a 
cycle of escalating violence which could be addressed early in the civil 
context by a state cannot be in Indian country, the void begins to impact the 
day-to-day lives of members, nonmembers, and non-Indians alike who 
choose to live on the reservation, in other aspects of daily life.  
Furthermore, there is no solid rationale by which many civil matters should 
not be heard in tribal court, for any rational system civil jurisdiction ought 
to be at least as extensive as criminal jurisdiction, given the degree of 
intrusion upon personal liberties.  But we have it backwards, thanks in no 
small part to federal common law. 
There are a substantial number of people, both nonmembers and non-
Indians, who escape any responsibility for their acts or omissions under the 
current law.  The United States decennial census does not canvas by enroll-
ment, but the figures do verify a substantial non-Indian population on the 
reservation.  In 2010, the census enumerated a total Standing Rock 
population of 8217, of which 1799 were not Indians.81  The tribe itself 
conducted a door-to-door census in 2002, which counted enrollees, non-
enrolled Indians, and non-Indians, with incomplete figures for just one 
district, the Running Antelope District.82  The tribe counted a total 
reservation population of 7124 persons, including at least 371 non-enrolled 
Indians and 1699 non-Indians.83 
In December 2008, 118 participants from tribal, state, and federal 
jurisdictions gathered in Palm Springs to address a very real lack of under-
standing that exists between and among the jurisdictions in a forum hosted 
by the United States Department of Justice and the National Judicial 
College at Reno.  The thoughts and contributions of the participants, 
including this author, in terms of the perception of tribal courts were 
 
80. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959). 
81. E-mail from Cheryl Penny, Dir. Workforce Investment Act, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 
to Helen Hanley (Aug. 2, 2001) (on file with author). 
82. Memorandum from Barbara Lee on Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Census Report (2002) 
(on file with author).  For purposes of their census, the tribe combined both non-enrolled members 
and non-Indians in their count. 
83. Id. 
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brought together in a brief summary.84  The group identified the challenge 
of substandard perceptions of tribal courts, reasoning that its judges may be 
non-law trained, and thus viewed as less knowledgeable.85  Also observed 
was a lack of understanding by state courts that tribes are sovereign 
governments, as well as a lack of respect of tribal courts by tribal and non-
tribal legal communities and the public.86 
The presented solutions called for an increased dialogue and infor-
mation sharing between tribal and state government agencies, visiting and 
collaboration of specialty courts, including teen or DUI courts, as well as 
the formation of forums and roundtable discussions on specific issues, thus 
helping develop peer relationships between tribal and state judges.87  As to 
the conference, the discussion between and among the judges and others 
attending resulted in a better understanding of the challenges facing tribal 
courts in their efforts to render justice in Indian county. 
North Dakota is in the lead among the states in bridging the divide 
between the state and its indigenous tribes.  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court has formed a joint State/Tribal Court Committee which strives to 
bring state and tribal courts together.88  Additionally, both North Dakota 
and South Dakota extend invitations to their judicial conferences to the 
tribal courts.  Dialogue with the other branches of state government has also 
seen similar improvement in recent years. 
In the case of North Dakota, its supreme court is a leader in extending 
recognition to tribal court orders and judgments under Rule 7.2 of the Rules 
of Court.89  The Rule recognizes the apparent concern of the federal courts 
for due process and appropriate process as conditions to recognition, which 
is, in this author’s opinion, needed.90  The substantial majority of tribal 
judges in the United States strive to provide continuity, predictability, and 
due process of law, which is also how the system should proceed.  Federal 
executive and congressional policy, as noted by Judge Canby, have been 
supportive of tribal efforts.91 
 
84. See NAT’L TRIBAL JUSTICE CTR., THE NAT’L JUDICIAL COLL., WALKING ON COMMON 





88. N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 37. 
89. N.D. R. CT. 7.2. 
90. See id. 
91. A good example of support of tribal efforts is the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, 
which enhances criminal sentencing by tribal courts which employ licensed attorneys as judges 
and public defenders.  See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234, 124 
Stat. 2258, 2279-82 (2010). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
As stated to Congress by the Assistant Attorney General, there are 
significant voids in present criminal and civil jurisdiction in Indian country.  
The fact remains that the tribal court is more accessible and more cognizant 
of the realities of reservation life than any state or federal court.  The 
primary impediments to the tribal court today are not the interests of the 
tribes in providing good courts, but in finding the resources to fund them. 
Ultimately, the most effective judicial system is that which is most 
closely connected to the population it serves.  In Indian country, the 
problems are over a hundred years in the making and will not be fixed over-
night.  Bringing effective courts to all of Indian country will require 
adequate resources.  It will require federal legislation to fill some of the 
present jurisdictional voids.  It will also require better thought-out case law, 
with opinions that chart a path from past to future, not just on a case-by-
case basis, but with some forethought as to the direction and as to the real-
world consequences of that direction.  Most of all, it will require under-
standing among all courts for Indian courts to join as full and equal partners 
with the state and federal courts.  It is the heartfelt hope of this author that 
this article may be one of many steps in that direction. 
 
